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The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution inspired
Gordon White politically and engaged him intellec-
tually Where Western commentators were either
dismissive or seduced by the political theatre that
characterised the Maoist project, Gordon, without
abandoning his political commitments, demon-
strated the need and the possibilities for serious
social science analysis. Micropolitics in Contemporwy
China which he published with Marc Blecher was
particularly important (1979). For although the
Cultural Revolution intruded into most aspects of
Chinese life, often in the most vicious ways, and
although there was a personalisation of power
through the cult of his personality and a politicisa-
tion of society through the cult of his writings, the
PartyState managed to carry out its state functions.
The first part of thïs article is concerned with the
personalisation of power and the second part with
the politicisation of society In both cases revolution-
ary iconography was developed to carry the mes-
sage. In part three the relationship between the
political theatre of the Maoist project and the politi-
cal process of a basic level unit during the Cultural
Revolution is examined through the work of Blecher
and White. A brief assessment concludes the article.
1 The Personalisation of Power
There is no shortage of literature on the Cultural
Revolution. But there is a movement away from the
early adulation and from the subsequent total con-
demnation towards the analysis of its complexities.
There is also the recognition of the need to distin-
guish between the 'high tide' years (1966-68) and
the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76). The
study of Chinese revolutionary iconography is
influencing this approach and is employed here
(see Evans and Donald 1999).
Mao Zedong role and the promotion of the cult of
his personality was crucial, but has to be seen as one
of several characteristics shaping the dynamics of
the Cultural Revolution. After all, Mao had criti-
cised Stalin cult of the individual as a 'rotten carry-
over from the long history of mankind' but fell short
of denouncing him (cited in Schram 1969:431; see
also Mao 1977:304). According to Stuart Schram,
Mao central and crucial role in bringing it [the
Cultural Revolutionl about is not subject to discus-
sion but there are those who argued that he was
merely the instrument, or the catalyst of objective
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forces rooted in Chinese history andlor in the logic
of a western-inspired revolutionary process. Others
saw it as an arbitrary charade resulting from the
caprice of an ageing and despotic ruler' (1986:613).
Lynn T. White III evaluates Mao's role in the context
of the broader origins of the Cultural Revolution to
demonstrate more precisely the role he did play:
'Mao role was to pull the pin on a grenade that he
did not make alone, and whose effects no one could
surely predict' (1989:310). Frederick Teiwes and
Warren Sun argue 'Even within the authoritarian
Chinese political tradition Mao's power was excep-
tional, a power comparable only to that exercised by
the most awesome emperors' (1996:164).
The purpose of this section is to situate Mao's role
and his personality cult within the dynamics of the
Maoist project and the Cultural Revolution. An
immediate impact created political theatre where the
'high tide' became synonymous with the Cultural
Revolution, a dimension which Blecher and White
tunnel beneath to reveal the political process of the
Partystate. The second is the re-emergence of Mao
Zedong as a symbol of authority, security and centre
of gravity on the stage on which the conflicts and ten-
sions of political theatre were played out in so far as
the Maoist project was an attack on the Partystate. A
longer term consequence was the embedding of the
personalisation of power and the devaluing, if not
undermining, of institutions. This was one of Mao's
legacies to his successors which was to haunt them
down to the Tiananmen protest of 1989 and beyond.
Chinese political iconography was a means but also a
relationship and a two-way one at that. Messages were
delivered, and received, but also interpreted and, no
doubt, misinterpreted. While there is nothing unique
in the promotion of a personality cult, the sheer vol-
ume, scale and pervasiveness of the iconography
along with that promoting agriculture, industry com-
merce, the Communist Party, the PLA, sport, health,
education, the new (my italics) culture, Chinese revo-
lutionary history patriotism, and that portraying
workers, peasants, soldiers, heroes and emulation
models, women, children, national minorities, foreign
friends and enemies, is revolutionary
More than 20,000 images of Mao were designed for
3.5 to 4.8 billion badges. These identified the wearer
with Mao and served as a ticket for admission to the-
atre politics. Audience participation was common. An
example of the fanaticism engendered during the
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'high tide' was the Red Flag Combat Regimental team
of the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics and its counter-
parts in other cities who attempted to turn China into
a 'Red Sea'. Wearing a Mao badge and carrying a copy
of Quotations of Chairman Mao, members painted
everything in sight red. According to one account 'the
stores, government offices, tea shops, noodle restau-
rants and various eateries were so completely covered
that it was impossible to tell which was which'. The
Central Committee and State Council were forced to
issue a proclamation at the end of 1966 titled 'Notice
about Restraining the Indiscriminate Action of the so-
called Red Sea' (Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao 1996:89-90).
Domination and power, as well as iconic adulation,
is most explicit in the 2.2 billion poster portraits of
Chairman Mao (Barmé 1996: 8). They signified
deification, distance and omnipresence. They iden-
tified him with the Chinese nation and as 'the state'
in counter-distinction to the Partystate or the Liu
Shaoqi faction. This visual representation was also
expedient given the limited means of alternative
communication, limited literacy and Mao limita-
tions as a public speaker. Consequently there was
no physical, let alone politically permissible, space
to challenge Chairman Mao, thereby imparting
meaning to the slogan 'the whole country is red'.
This is the total personalisation of power.
Great care could be taken in presentation. Posters
would be reproduced from oils, watercolours and
photographs. The principal standards for painting
Mao after 1971 were 'red, bright and shining'. For the
red flag and for the star on Mao's cap only the purest
red pigment could be used (Silbergeld 1993:43). The
portraits and posters can be classified into those that
feature Mao directly and those that represent him
indirectly In the first set Mao either fully occupies or
shares poster space, and may be depicted in different
poses, settings and at different ages. In the second set
this domination is represented indirectly and symbol-
ically, or by what Stephanie Donald describes as icons
of political activism (Donald 1999). The figures may
be wearing Mao badges depicting Mao, carrying the
Quotations of Chairman Mao or copies of the Selected
Works, or may be Red Guards wearing armbands con-
sidering themselves acting on his behalf, mouthing
slogans while the captions may repeat his quotations.
They may appear in combination and in non-political
settings to promote production, education or health,
for example. In every poster however they are expres-
sions of power.
A poster of Mao addressing a Red Guard rally from
the bridge outside Tiananmen appeared in several
versions. A 1967 painting, widely reproduced,
shows Chairman Mao on the bridge with Zhou
Enlai, Lin Biao and the leaders of the Cultural
Revolution Group, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing and
Kang Sheng. They wear Mao badges and hold the
Quotations of Chairman Mao. Mao's right hand is
stretched out as if to shake hands with the adoring
crowd wearing Red Guard armbands, badges and
carrying 'little red books'. The scene is one of Mao
investing the crowd with a mission. The captions
read: 'The hearts of Chairman Mao and the revolu-
tionary masses beat in union' and 'Chairman Mao,
to see you marks the realisation of our most cher-
ished dreams. We will never forget these happy
times. Guided by your brilliant thoughts we will
bring the revolution to a conclusion.'
A 1973 version, based on a painting by seven artists, is
less militant, but also less celebratory and more
authoritarian. Mao is depicted in a Lenin-like pose
with his left arm raised and outstretched towards the
admiring crowd. Even though workers, peasants and
soldiers have replaced the Cultural Revolution group,
including Zhou Enlai and the disgraced and now dead
Un Biao, and the Utile Red Book has vanished, the
physical and emotional distance between Mao and the
crowd has increased. An inscription on the left reads
'Long Uve the Communist Party of China' and on the
right 'Follow Chairman Mao's Long March'. The cap-
tion reads: 'March forward to achieve the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution'. The 1976 version is
identical to that of 1973 with the exception of the cap-
tion which now reads 'As far as consolidating the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, guarding against capitalist
restoration and establishing socialism are concerned,
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution could not be
more necessary or timely'. Posters then could be
altered to fit changing circumstances but Mao was
always placed centre-stage and occupied the most
space. The same applies to the posters of the 1970s
which are more specific in content and pacific in
approach in contrast to the mobilisation themes of the
1960s. For example, posters show Mao on 'inspection
tours'. A prominent theme refers to his Report on the
Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan
(1927), on the revolutionary potential of the peasantry
In one poster, 'Chairman Mao's rural investigation in
the Jinggang mountains', he appears as a young revo-
lutionary in uniform. Even though the crowd are
armed peasants who were supporting the early Red
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Army base they do not appear aggressive or threaten-
ing. It is a meeting among equals. A second poster,
'Chairman Mao visiting Guangdong Province' depicts
Mao and a crowd of peasants, some of whom are wear-
ing badges, striding across the countryside. Mao is
slightly in the lead accompanied by the team or
brigade leader. He cuts a striking figure but not, as in
the earlier posters, disproportionately so. Yet his white
shirt, open at the neck, and grey trousers are markedly
different from the working clothes of the peasants. A
southern peasant hat, however, in his right hand, as
well as being functional, serves as a badge of identifi-
cation, as signified by two similar hats in the crowd. It
is a happy scene, with the crowd pleased to show
Chairman Mao their achievements since the founding
of the communes and take pleasure in his presence.
A third, late poster (1977) reproduces another
favourite theme, 'A heart to heart talk'. Mao is dressed
so as to identify him with rural China; yet his outfit
contrasts with those of the peasants, which clearly
identifies them with the Yan'an region. He sits chat-
ting, smoking, drinking tea with and listening to the
small crowd. Also set in Yan'an is another popular
poster depicting Mao in a celebratory crowd. Here, in
'A new spring in Yan'an', Mao as expected is centre
stage, wearing a dress tunic, smoking and not por-
trayed markedly out of proportion with the crowd.
What is most unusual, however, is that it is one of the
few posters in which he is shown making human con-
tact - and then with a child (see also Laing 1988, fig-
ures 65-7). Even when he is sited as part of the
crowd, narrowing the distance with the viewer, a
degree of distance is usually maintained by the
absence of physical contact. The crowd is also inter-
esting for its representation of different groups in the
area. Printed in 1972, the Quotations and Mao badges
are absent, but the slogans displayed by the children
read: 'Be self-sufficient - use your own resources'.
There is no shortage of posters representing Mao
indirectly through icons of activism. For example,
one repeats the popular slogan 'Chairman Mao is
the red sun in our hearts'. Although dated 1966, in
place of the Red Guards and the Quotations of
Chairman Mao, the poster features the cultural rev-
olutionary correct triumvirate of worker, peasant
(often female), and soldier, with minority national-
ities in the background holding the Selected Works of
Mao Zedong. While the worker in the foreground
holds his copy aloft, the others hold their copies
against their hearts.
2 The Politicisation of Society
The cult of Mao's personality is well documented,
even though the responsibility for its promotion
remains disputed. Less well known is the cult of Mahi
writings, at least for systematic analysis. The two, of
course, are closely related, The writings contributed
to the promotion of the cult of personality and the
writings would not have acquired their own authority
and status independent of Mao's power. They were
legitimated as MarxismLeninism, Mao Zedong
Thought. The writings served other purposes too.
They were employed in the factional struggle between
the Maoists and the Partystate. Each faction could
feed upon the writings either imbibing revolutionary
inspiration or advocating practical caution. The writ-
ings, like the posters, were also meant for discussion
(Gittings 1999) and, like the badges, they were icons
of power carried or clutched in the hands of millions
of people. Above all, they were the instrument of the
largest experiment in the politicalisation of society
that was ever undertaken. As Lin Biao wrote in the
introduction to the Quotations, 'the large-scale publi-
cation ... is a vital measure for enabling the broad
masses to grasp Mao Tse-Tung Thought and for pro-
moting the revolutionization of our people's thinking'
(Mao 1966). In addition to the official characterisa-
tion of Mao as 'Great Leader, Great Teacher, Supreme
Commander and Great Helmsman', he could be
styled 'Great Political Entrepreneur'.
The Quotations and Mao's Selected Works readings and
poems figure prominently in photographs and in the
poster art of the Cultural Revolution. In short, his writ-
ings were ubiquitous. According to the New China
News Agency by the end of 1967, 86.4 million sets of
the Selected Works, 47.5 million copies of the Selected
Readings, and 57 million copies of Mao's collected
poems were published (cited in Ch'en, 1969: 41-2).
In particular, there were the Quotations popularly
packaged as the Little Red Book. Originally published
for the People's Liberation Army in 1964, estimates
vary between 350 million and one billion copies dis-
tributed. Both the colour and the size would have been
deliberate. Red was the colour of the Cultural
Revolution, but it also promoted visibility and, as with
the badges, signified Mao as the red sun in the hearts
of the Chinese people. The pocket size encouraged
portability so that the book, like the badge, was a mark
of identification but one that could be waved and the
quotations recited, shouted or even sung (365 were set
to music) if the situation demanded (Barmé 1996:190,
note 10). Most of all, the quotations could be carried
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to the compulsory study sessions or pulled out and
read whenever and wherever convenient.
As for the contents, the Little Red Book was divided
hito 33 chapters covering the Communist Party
cadres and members; class struggle, the mass line,
and democracy; imperialism, people's war, patrio-
tism and internationalism; self-reliance, self-cultiva-
tion and self-criticism; women and young people,
culture and art. The entries were drawn from Mao's
speeches, reports and writings. Some were simply
epigrams, others were substantial in length and
substance and might appear in more than one chap-
ter as deemed appropriate. These included extracts
from 'On Practice', 'On Contradiction', 'Report on
an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in
Hunan' and, in particular, 'On the Correct Handling
of Contradictions Among the People'. Mao
favourite, 'The Foolish Old Man who Removed the
Mountains', a metaphor to conquer imperialism
and feudalism, appears in full (see Appendix 1).
The Little Red Book was not just (my italics) for chant-
ing or shouting slogans, as often characterised in the
Western press. The method drew upon precedents in
the Chinese history of learning through memorisation
by recitation, for example, of Confucius's Sayings, a
method which is still prominent in Chinese pedagogy
Lin Biao in his introduction to the Quotations
instructed units to select the passages for study 'that
are relevant to the situation, their tasks, the current
thinking of their personnel, and the state of their
work' (Mao 1966). In sum, the Little Red Book was a
distillation of Mao Zedong Thought or the official ide-
ology and provided the acceptable and conceptual
vocabulary for public discourse.
Mao's Quotations and other writings also figured
prominently as icons of power. They were used in
poster art to promote Mao Zedong Thought and
enhance the status of whatever else was being por-
trayed (Evans and Donald 1999:10). In this sense
the icon is more important than the substance. Like
the badges tobe worn, the volumes were deemed to
be seen. For example, a 1971 poster celebrates: 'the
construction of the bridge over the Yangzi at
Nanjing is a great victory for Mao Zedong Thought'
(Landsberger 1998:58-9). In the foreground are
four workers and one soldier. The one woman is
holding aloft a portrait of Mao. Two workers and
the soldier are wearing Mao badges. One worker
and the soldier are carrying the Little Red Book and
another is carrying the Selected Works. All are sur-
rounded by red flags. It is left to the viewer to inter-
pret how it is a triumph for Mao Zedong Thought.
3 Micropolitics in Contemporary
China
Blecher and White work is of a different order from
the foregoing. Micro politics in Contemporary China can
be likened to going backstage at the political theatre
of the Cultural Revolution. The importance of their
study lies in their systematic and rigorous analysïs of
the interaction between the political theatre that char-
acterised the Maoist project and the ordinary func-
tioning of a unit at the basic level of governance. This
was offstage for most observers of the Cultural
Revolution. Blecher and White set out to discover the
kind of politics that took place during the course of
the Cultural Revolution. What they found was an
extremely complex and multifaceted political process.
Our interest is in the extent to which the personali-
sation of power and the politicisation of society
intruded in the work and life of a technical unit or,
in their words, 'the relationship between the move-
ment in this particular unit and nationwide ideolog-
ical content and political dynamics of the Cultural
Revolution' (1979:2). The unit was engaged in tech-
nical survey work as part of a long-term nationwide
scientific programme. As such it is particularly ger-
mane for the present purposes. First, the unit was
relatively isolated from the epicentre of the Cultural
Revolution. Second, the personnel involved were
tightly defined, administrative and technical, so that
the political issues, ideological appeals and class and
professional conflicts are identifiable. Third, the
study is not confined to the 'high tide' period so that
the changes within the unit are traced over the
course of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the
movement got off to a slow start due to the remote
location of the unit and the number of personnel
who were absent through fieldwork. This may well
have insulated the unit from the most intense ideo-
logical struggles of the Cultural Revolution.
Blecher and White test their data, which is primarily
based on a series of interviews with an unusually
qualified informant, against four 'ideal types' of polit-
ical process: ideological politics; policy politics;
group interests; and particularistic politics.
According to the authors, the Cultural Revolution
had a differential impact on the unit ranging from the
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profound, and even traumatic, to the superficial.
Moreover, the changes brought about by the move-
ment gradually wore off as the unit resumed its nor-
mal technical work in 1973 and 1974. Significant
political alignments, organisational changes and dis-
ruption to work took place but were relatively short-
lived. The authors are cautious in their assessment of
attitudinal changes. Inter-personal relationships were
affected well into the 1970s; awareness and knowl-
edge of issues increased; and the political themes of
the Cultural Revolution changed and expanded 'the
agenda of legitimate political issues ...' (1979:125).
The inferences that can be drawn from Blecher and
White's work are not straight forward. The Maoist
project seems to have set the stage and provided the
script for particulanstic issues and conflicts within
the technical unit. They note that the vocabulary
employed was that of the national campaign, for
example, 'bureaucratism', 'capitalist road', 'right-
ism', but the radical transformation that the ideol-
ogy of the project demanded did not occur. It seems
reasonable to suggest, however, that there was a
'politicisation' above and beyond the ordinary poli-
tics that preceded and followed the Cultural
Revolution. There is no evidence of a cult of Mao's
personality, and criticism and support of those in
power and authority within the unit focused on
individuals rather than cadres as such (1979:90).
The personalisation of power at its most virulent led
to the suicide of the head of the political office.
4 Some Concluding Thoughts
Political iconography is a subject for study on its own
merits (Benewick and Donald 1996; Benewick 1999).
Following the insights of Evans and Donald (1999), it
has been used in the present context to develop two
themes of the Cultural Revolution: the personalisation
of power and the politicisation of Chinese society
Political iconography is also revealing where more
conventional forms of information are limited. We do
not know, however, whether political iconography
played a significant part in the factional politics of the
technical unit. Taking into account the location of the
unit, the delay in the start of the movement and the
educated personnel involved, it was probably rela-
tively scarce, which suggests that the Cultural
Revolution was not totalising or monolithic. Yet mes-
sages were transmitted and, even if subject to con-
flicting interpretations and perceptions, contributed
to the politicisation of the unit and personalisation of
power. What Blecher and White demonstrate, among
other things, is that this was of a different order from
the political theatre of the Maoist project. That the
unit recovered from the disruption and resumed nor-
mal work suggests a triumph of the Partystate. That
there was longer term institutional devaluation can be
ascribed to the legacy of Maoist politics.
Appendix
The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the
Mountains (Mao 1945, 1966:201-2)
There is an ancient Chinese fable called 'The Foolish
Man Who Removed the Mountains'. It tells of an old
man who lived in northern China long, long ago and
was known as the Foolish Old Man of North
Mountain. His house faced south and beyond his
doorway stood the two great peaks, Taihang and
Wangwu, obstructing the way With great determina-
tïon, he led his sons in digging up these mountains,
hoe in hand. Another greybeard, known as the Wise
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